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Eurasian security is vital to humanity. 
Being both the source and the crossroads of the 
world’s energy resources, as well as much of the 
current ethnic and religious dissatisfaction with 
modernity and globalization, Eurasia will be the 
battleground where the conflicting dynamics 
of religion, globalization, nationalism and 
modernization will be fought. 
The global scope of these issues, which 
are threatening to erode established patterns 
of governance in many parts of the region, has 
pushed China into a more active role in Central 
Asia; it has pushed European integration, in an 
effort to gain added weight for Europe in world 
affairs; and it has fostered U.S. intervention in 
the region’s conflicts. Given the history of the 
past decade, it is probably no exaggeration to say 
that – the outcome of these efforts to resolve the 
problems of security in Eurasia will determine 
the success or failure of the 21st century. 
All too often, however, when we consider 
the size of the region and the magnitude of the 
challenges it faces, the actual people who reside 
there disappear. Many western analysts argue that 
existing boundaries, cultures, and populations 
will all be swept along by the inexorable forces 
of global commerce and democratization. In this 
view, made popular by Francis Fukuyama in the 
early 1990s, the collapse of the USSR removed 
the last obstacle to this. 
But the collapse of the USSR has also left 
an unexpected void at the heart of Eurasia. This 
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void has become not only the source of Russia’s 
security concerns, but of the security dilemmas 
of every other nation in this vast region. If this 
void is not filled we can expect the 21st century to 
be no less bloody than the 20th
The major powers on Eurasia’s periphery 
have each proposed their own solutions to how to 
fill this security void. 
The Chinese solution envisions a long 
term, gradual binding of more and more Eurasia 
countries into a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. In Southeast Asia local Chinese elites 
already exert effective control over domestic 
politics, which essentially guarantees a Chinese 
veto over political initiatives deemed undesirable – 
a more intrusive variant of what was once known 
in Europe as “Finlandization.” While undeniably 
successful in co-opting local elites, this model 
has also spawned resentment among the middle 
class in these nations that suspect they are not 
deriving as much benefit as the elite from this 
arrangement. It has therefore never been applied 
successfully to civilizations that are not in some 
way derivative or dependent on China. When 
these meet they clash, and political scientists 
like Samuel Huntington have predicted just such 
a clash with China’s main economic rival, the 
United States.
The Chinese solution for Eurasian security 
therefore suffers from the fact that it is not a truly 
consensual model based on an equal partnership. 
Because of this fundamental inequality it will 
do little to resolve the sources of insecurity in 
Eurasia, which involve the reassertion of cultural 
and religious identities. Its strength, however, 
lies in a subtly crafted diplomacy that apparently 
respects the status quo and does not demand that 
local traditions change, while binding countries 
with ties that benefit them economically;
The European solution has worked very well 
within the northwestern corner of Eurasia. But 
while it promotes itself as a potentially universal 
model, it is actually the result of a unique history 
of industrialization and colonialism that spread 
commercialism intensely throughout the world. 
This model survived the collapse of the British 
Empire only because of the rise of the USSR, 
which forced the United States to take over 
Britain’s global role in propagating consumerism 
and Western culture. Finally, the policy of 
containment provided Western Europeans with a 
common purpose that pushed them to integrate 
much further and more quickly than anyone had 
imagined possible. 
But Western Europe’s success in forging 
a common civilizational framework has also 
distanced it from its neighbors, making Europe’s 
integration into Eurasia much more difficult. Just 
crossing the Bosporus has proved impossible for 
Europeans, and there is no stomach for tackling 
the even more radical challenge of addressing 
security issues from Vancouver to Vladivostok, 
and from Mumbai to Murmansk. The model works 
well for those already live within it, but since it 
cannot be expanded and is therefore inadequate 
to the growing external threats that Europe now 
faces. Its strength lies in providing a successful 
example of how institutional integration can, 
in fact, erode centuries of hostility and forge 
stability and prosperity.
The American solution is, perhaps, the 
simplest of all. In the short run it has sought to 
replace Russia, not to defend regional security, 
but to promote stable energy supplies and remove 
the strategic weapons that threaten American 
security. In the long term it has promoted political 
institutions and ideas that reflect America’s view 
of economics and politics as sources of long term 
stability in Eurasia. American neo-conservatives 
unabashedly saw the void created by the collapse 
of the USSR as an opportunity for reshaping the 
region. This led to rather blatant US intervention 
in several CIS countries, with results that very few 
in Washington today, however, find satisfactory. 
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The American solution to this rests on 
the popularity of its well known commercial-
cultural symbols, the brands that dominate 
global commerce, entertainment, and politics. 
Thanks to this dominance private enterprise, 
individualism, and global commerce have 
come to be seen as crucial to national 
competitiveness. As neo-conservatives like 
to point out, America’s presence throughout 
the globe, has become the de facto basis of 
world government. What they do not like to 
admit is that in the process, social tensions 
have been unleashed that they can no longer 
control. Unleashing the power of the individual 
has been America’s greatest legacy, while the 
failure to link individual interests back to the 
common good has been its greatest failure. As 
a result, the once popular notion that this model 
represents the aspirations of all mankind is no 
longer so widely accepted, and as America’s 
cultural dominance becomes less pronounced, 
it is likely to find fewer and fewer admirers. 
Russia’s solution to Eurasia’s security 
dilemmas is the most sketchy. As I understand it, 
it is based on the following syllogism:
1/ Modernization is essential for Russia’s 
survival;
2/ Russian foreign policy must create 
conditions that allow Russian to modernize;
3/ Peace, stability and prosperity in Eurasia 
are critical to success.
All of these are true statements, but there is 
as yet no strategy that connects them. What has 
emerged is a set of ad hoc measures, in different 
areas, that are meant to change the tone of 
relations in the region. So far, however, their only 
selling point is that they come from the Russia – 
the one indispensable actor in Eurasia. 
One related measure is the recently proposed 
Grand Euro-Atlantic Treaty, which is modeled 
on the analogy of the CSCE, but goes further 
in specifying conflict resolution mechanisms. 
But that is where the similarities end. Whereas 
the CSCE arose out of protracted negotiations 
between two relatively evenly matched blocks, 
Russia today, while stronger than it was ten years 
ago, is still weak and unable to exert its influence 
effectively throughout the region. 
For many in the West this means that Russia’s 
interests can be dismissed when discussing a 
strategy for Eurasian security. One example is the 
way in which President Medvedev’s declaration 
of “privileged interests,” has been totally 
misinterpreted, its potential as a starting point 
for dialogue with other nations in Eurasia lost. 
Unless Russian policy becomes more focused 
and assertive, the Euro-Atlantic Treaty will likely 
suffer the same fate.
Still, the fact that Russia’s strategy is 
disjointed is not all bad. It also means that it is 
the most susceptible to adaptation and growth, 
including untapped resources. Compared with 
the other major powers Russia has the advantage 
of sharing a common cultural sphere with many 
other nations in the region, a legacy of the both 
the Soviet and Russian empires. Then, there is the 
obvious advantage of Russia’s wealth of energy 
resources. To date, Russia has not linked these 
particular advantages to an overall Eurasian 
strategy, and as a result its attempt to exert 
influence seem heavy-handed and often lead to 
counter-reactions. Conceivably, however, it could 
develop the soft power skills needed to advance 
its regional influence in ways that will guarantee 
the desired outcome without appearing to force 
concessions, in the same way that the United 
States does with respect to Canada, Mexico or its 
European allies.
Russia’s singular advantage, however is 
that it has already recognized that the region’s 
problems are interrelated, and of such magnitude 
that no single nation, or group of nations, 
can solve them. It has therefore been at the 
forefront of creating the regional structures and 
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relationships that are needed, rather than merely 
working within the existing institutions that are 
clearly inadequate to the task. 
>>>>>
To sum up, no major power has yet devised a 
good model for dealing with the security problems 
of Eurasia, and it is certainly arguable that these 
problems are so great that they defy any broad 
strategy. 
Still, I would like to think that there are 
elements in the approaches I’ve just discussed 
that overlap, and that could be combined and 
coordinated in ways that mutually reinforce 
positive tendencies, rather than multiplying 
negative ones by acting at cross purposes, as is 
currently the case.
Such a strategy would focus on the 
following:
1/ A diplomacy that is reassuring – that 
respects the international status quo and does 
not gratuitously threaten stability by challenging 
local traditions and cultures in the name of 
universal rights, but that also sets the stage for 
transforming that status quo through consensual 
mechanisms; 
2/ Successful examples of institutional 
and cultural interaction, especially ones that 
have succeeded in reducing religious and ethnic 
hostilities, eventually setting the stage for the 
codification of standards of civilized behavior 
toward one’s own citizens;
3/ Integration of nations and regions into the 
global economy, providing an increased role for 
both individual and collective enterprise, leading 
eventually toward treaties that expand basic 
liberal principles in domestic and international 
relations that will foster economic and social well 
being;
The difficulty of each one of these tasks 
is exacerbated not just by reluctance of elites 
to change, but also by the fact that, in order 
to be successful, in each arena there must 
be breakthrough that leads to a qualitative 
transformation in international relations, one that 
stresses mutual responsibility over individual 
security. 
Therefore, the final requirement for such a 
strategy is understanding that existing institutions 
are insufficient to address these complex issues, 
and that new ones must replace them. In much the 
same way that the discussions of global climate 
change have slowly begun to affect international 
relations, by pointing to the need for all nations 
to take responsibility, the same must occur if 
security in Eurasia is to become a reality.
I speak of creating the pre-conditions for a 
diplomacy of longue duree, one that sacrifices low 
priority shor term benefits for high priority long 
term objectives; I speak of security arrangements 
based on mutual vulnerability; I speak of financial 
structures that take global social, environmental, 
and social costs into account when defining 
profit.
One way to do this is to defines true 
security as a function of cultural pluralism, both 
within nation-states and among them. It is no 
longer possible to reduce security to the level of 
the nation-state, because a society is more than 
the sum of its parts. Confusing the nation-state 
with society can lead to serious errors when 
identifying threats since, particularly after the 
Cold War, society has been more threatened 
that the state. The unique security challenges 
of the 21st century arise from the simultaneous 
appearance of BOTH subnational and 
metanational challenges, and yet we have seen 
time and again in recent years that the security 
that is most threatened today is not sovereignty, 
but identity—both at the subnational level, 
where it cohesion and loyalty are essential for 
a society’s survival, as well as the metanational 
level, where security threats have arisen that 
existing nation-state system cannot deal with.
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The solution is to encourage the formation 
of overlapping identities that do not coincide 
with the boundaries of nation-states. These can 
be cultural, tribal, religious, linguistic, familial, 
even metapolitical, as in the case of the European 
Union. 
As I see it, the pre-conditions for cultural 
security in Eurasia involves three steps. First, 
the creation of a political image that resonates 
within the existing political order and national 
cultures. Second, the promotion of this political 
image so that, over time, alternative political 
identities can emerge that can overcome the 
void left by the collapse of old identities. And, 
third, ensuring that this new political identity 
is institutionalized and incorporates the basic 
liberal values that permit unity in diversity, 
so that a larger and unifying Eurasian identity 
emerges as an additional layer of national 
identity, rather than in opposition to it.
Ultimately, a space needs to be created in 
which existing societies and cultures cannot 
be reduced to the confines of the present 
international state system, or merely to the 
functioning of global markets. Instead, it must 
be an international regime whose primary task is 
cultural dialogue, with structures adapted to the 
specific conditions of cultural exchange, and can 
shift the political incentives that define security 
from ones of short term advantage, to ones of 
long term mutual responsibility.
Russia is at the heart of this process, or 
perhaps I should say, at its bull’s eye. Being at the 
periphery would be easier, but Russia’s destiny 
as the heartland of Eurasia is determined by 
geography and not by choice. To thrive, Russia 
will need to offer a vision of Eurasian security 
that exceeds her capacity; a vision comparable to 
that of Jean Monnet, the father of the EU, when 
he said: «the unification of Europe is not the end 
goal, but merely one step toward the organized 
world of the future.»
If Russia can do this, it will save itself and 
save the world. If it fails, then both may perish.
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